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65 
THE NUDGING BALLOT? A RESPONSE TO 
PROFESSOR FOLEY 
LISA MARSHALL MANHEIM* 
For those committed to greater “equality of campaign 
discourse,”1 Edward Foley offers a shrewd proposal: Stop trying to 
limit speech in preexisting forums. The Supreme Court simply won’t 
allow it. Instead, Professor Foley suggests, create new forums—
forums that even the Supreme Court is likely to concede may be 
subject to equality-promoting measures—and tailor them as needed. 
For Professor Foley, the first place to turn is the ballot. The state 
could transform that space from what it is now (according to the 
Supreme Court, a state-controlled tool for electing candidates, not a 
“forum for political expression”)2 into a digitized forum for speech. 
By analogy to the broadcasting precedents,3 Professor Foley argues, 
the government would be free to set the terms of the debate. 
Professor Foley’s central insight is powerful, and his turn to the 
ballot both thought-provoking and creative. Though the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly expressed its aversion to the government 
interjecting itself “into the debate over who should govern,”4 the 
implementation of a “speaking ballot” seemingly would have a 
stronger case for constitutionality under current doctrine than do 
many of the existing, beleaguered restrictions on campaign-related 
speech.5 Moreover, the speaking ballot appears to have the potential 
 
 * Copyright © 2014 by Lisa Marshall Manheim, Assistant Professor, University of 
Washington School of Law. I am deeply grateful to Ned Foley for the opportunity to join 
this debate and also to the Brennan Center for hosting the conference that inspired this 
symposium. My gratitude extends, in addition, to Kate Andrias, Ryan Calo, Ron Collins, 
Johanna Kalb, Liz Porter, and Zahr Said for their insights regarding this response. 
 1  Edward B. Foley, The Speaking Ballot: A New Way to Foster Equality of Campaign 
Discourse, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 52 (2014). 
 2  See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 363 (1997) (“Ballots 
serve primarily to elect candidates, not as forums for political expression.”); see also Wash. 
State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 461 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring) (stating that the Court never has considered the ballot a public forum). 
 3  See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (upholding 
limits on participation in publicly broadcasted candidate debate). 
 4  McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 5 Cf. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 676 (confirming, in the context of a state-owned public 
television broadcaster sponsoring a candidate debate, that reasonable, viewpoint-neutral 
exercises of the state actor’s discretion are constitutional). The Supreme Court also has 
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to influence elections.6 It is rare, in the world of campaign-related 
speech, to encounter proposals for reform that enjoy both these 
qualities: the potential to make a difference and the ability to secure 
five votes from the Roberts Court. As a result, those committed to 
greater equality in the speech market are well advised to accept 
Professor Foley’s inspired invitation to explore new speech forums. 
At the same time, ushering in a new era for ballots—transforming 
them from a utilitarian tool into a heavily regulated forum for 
speech—comes at a potentially high cost. While the speaking ballot 
may, in fact, affect elections, that influence may be due less to a 
flourishing of informed and reasoned debate and more to the 
exploitation of subtle forms of voter manipulation. 
The speech of Professor Foley’s proposed forum, which must 
compete with so many others in order to be effective, has a significant 
advantage: It is delivered via one of the most important and 
influential tools in a democracy. And that is the ballot.7 As Professor 
Mary Beth Beazley has explained, when government actors design a 
ballot, they become, to quote Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, 
“‘choice architects,’”8 and, as such, “they must be aware that ‘small 
 
indicated, in a different context, that “last-minute campaigning” is more likely to be 
protected than prohibited by the Constitution. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 217–18 
(1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 220 (1966) 
(holding that a newspaper could not be barred from running an election-day editorial 
attempting to persuade readers how to vote). It nevertheless remains possible that some 
variation of Professor Foley’s proposal, as implemented, could fall before a novel 
constitutional challenge, cf. Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 465 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(acknowledging constitutional concerns that can arise in light of the “special role that a 
state-printed ballot plays in elections”); id. at 460 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“[W]hat 
makes the ballot ‘special’ is precisely the effect it has on voter impressions.”), particularly 
if future litigants were to fashion their lawsuit as an as-applied challenge, cf. id.; 552 U.S. 
442 (2008) (rejecting a facial challenge to an allegedly confusing ballot format while 
acknowledging that a later as-applied challenge might be successful). Presumably, the 
strength of such a challenge would depend in part on how much control, and what type of 
control, the state had attempted to exercise over the speech contained in the ballot. Cf. 
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441–42 (articulating concerns over the Government 
“impermissibly inject[ing]” itself into “the debate over who should govern” and insisting 
that “those who govern should be the last people to help decide who should govern” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 6  The speaking ballot may influence elections through the facilitation of speech, as 
Professor Foley so eloquently explains. See Foley, supra note 1, at 53. Yet, as discussed 
below, the adoption of a speaking ballot also may affect elections by increasing the 
opportunity for design-related nudging and manipulation. 
 7  See, e.g., E. Scott Adler & Thad E. Hall, Ballots, Transparency, and Democracy, 12 
ELECTION L.J. 146, 148 (2013) (confirming that, in the transition away from the “vote 
market” that had dominated American politics prior to the late 1800s, the most important 
reforms involved ballot design and regulation). 
 8  Mary Beth Beazley, Ballot Design as Fail-Safe: An Ounce of Rotation Is Worth a 
Pound of Litigation, 12 ELECTION L.J. 18, 19 (2013) (quoting RICHARD H. THALER & 
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and apparently insignificant details can have major impacts on 
people’s behavior.’”9 Professor Beazley discusses, for example, the 
errors that voters tend to make in response to particular ballot-design 
flaws, as well as the tendency of some voters to vote for whichever 
candidate happens to be listed first on the ballot.10 Drawing on 
empirical research demonstrating the effect of such votes,11 Professor 
Beazley’s work helps to confirm the significance of each and every 
seemingly innocuous decision surrounding the design and 
implementation of any ballot. 
For choice architects employed by a Secretary of State’s office, 
the transition to a speaking ballot would introduce a host of new 
decision points. Must, for example, the state ensure that all videos 
load at the same speed? Presumably it must. But what if a state 
official slows down all load times after realizing that an opposition 
party’s candidates have a particularly effective batch of videos in a 
given election? And there are, of course, many appearance-related 
options. Who, for example, chooses which photo or graphic will 
appear to announce each video? Particularly flattering (or 
unflattering) screenshots would have at least the potential to affect 
close elections.12 What about timing? Would candidates be able to 
update videos as the election draws closer? Could a state change its 
rules on timing if some controversy emerged? The list of potentially 
consequential rules and decisions is as deep as the creativity of those 
seeking to exploit them. And they affect elections in ways that are 
normatively troubling. As the work of Professor Beazley and others 
has shown, these types of rules and decisions often prey on the 
tendency of individuals to make “predictable mistakes” in their 
interaction with visual information.13 
It is into this sensitive area that Professor Foley proposes we 
introduce not only speech, but digital speech. This turn to digital 
 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND 
HAPPINESS 3 (2008)); see also id. (explaining that the term “choice architects” describes 
individuals who “design the structures that people use to exercise a choice”).  
 9  Beazley, supra note 8, at 19 (quoting THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 3). 
 10  Beazley, supra note 8, at 20–21. She terms these “position-influenced votes,” 
defined as valid votes that were “influenced in some way by the position of particular 
candidates within each contest” on the ballot. Id. at 20. 
 11  See, e.g., id. at 21 n.22–24 and accompanying text. 
 12  This discussion triggers another line of concerns: how featuring a candidate’s 
appearance so prominently on the ballot might affect electoral outcomes. See, e.g., Carol 
K. Sigelman et al., Gender, Physical Attractiveness, and Electability: An Experimental 
Investigation of Voter Biases, 16 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 229 (1986) (analyzing the 
impact of perceived physical attractiveness on female political candidates). 
 13  Beazley, supra note 8, at 29. 
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media is both timely and sensible, for the digitalization of campaign-
related speech is already underway.14 Yet the potential for 
manipulation is fast on its heels. Consider, for example, Jonathan 
Zittrain’s description of an emerging phenomenon—which he terms 
“digital gerrymandering”15—that might be exploited to influence 
elections. Professor Zittrain points to a 2010 study in which 
researchers found they could influence voting behavior through 
simple tweaks to users’ Facebook accounts—a link to a polling place, 
a button to click to indicate a user had voted, the selective display of 
particular friends’ profiles. It is not hard to imagine the next step, as 
Professor Zittrain adeptly does: Simply limit this get-out-the-vote 
effort to those users whose political preferences appear to match the 
intermediary’s, and—faster than a team of lawyers can attack a 
collection of hanging chads—an election starts swinging. 
The potential for such influence may be concerning, but it is not 
surprising. Privacy scholars, such as my colleague Ryan Calo, have 
offered vivid accounts of the potential for “digital market 
manipulation,” where the “manipulation” in question refers to 
deliberate efforts to nudge individuals toward certain outcomes 
through the exploitation of irrational human tendencies.16 So defined, 
digitally facilitated manipulation appears to be growing as quickly as 
the implementing technology will allow it. Website “morphing,” for 
example, uses digital data to match a particular individual with the 
advertising pitch most likely to persuade her to act—an 
implementation of so-called “persuasion profiling.”17 While it may be 
impossible to pinpoint exactly why individuals tend to respond to 
such seemingly slight tweaks to an advertisement’s messaging (text 
rather than images, or an appeal to popularity rather than some other 
frame), irrationality tells at least part of the tale; it is otherwise hard 
to understand, for example, how subtly blending a photograph of a 
politician with the photograph of a subject tends to make that subject 
 
 14  See, e.g., Jim Rutenberg, Data You Can Believe in, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2013 
(Magazine), at 22 (describing how staffers used digital data, along with other resources, to 
develop highly effective marketing techniques for President Obama’s reelection 
campaign). 
 15  See Jonathan Zittrain, Engineering an Election, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 335, 336 
(2014), http://harvardlawreview.org/2014/06/engineering-an-election/ (defining digital 
gerrymandering as the “selective presentation of information by an intermediary to meet 
its agenda rather than to serve its users”). 
 16  Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1000–03 
(2014). Professor Calo’s article begins with the seminal work of Jon Hanson and Douglas 
Kysar before overlaying it with the prospect of systematic, digitally enabled 
personalization. Id. 
 17  Id. 
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more inclined to trust the politician.18 
Professor Foley’s speaking ballot is, of course, not Facebook. 
And his calls for easily accessible campaign videos and mediated 
debates among candidates are a far cry from the intentionally 
intrusive, personalized attempts at digital manipulation that are 
beginning to emerge in the private sector. That said, even Professor 
Foley’s more tempered proposal quickly leads to difficult questions 
related to privacy and manipulation—such as who, if anyone, might 
be entitled to access speaking-ballot metadata, which presumably 
would yield invaluable insight into how voters chose to interact, or 
decline to interact, with the relevant media and how that might have 
affected their votes. Moreover, it is not clear whether or how 
techniques that lead to nudging should be regulated in this context. 
At core, the purpose of the speaking ballot is not to facilitate weakly 
effective speech, but rather to facilitate speech that can compete with 
outside campaign discourse. And it is hard to compete when only the 
latter type of discourse can incorporate the most effective forms of 
nudging available. 
In short, Professor Foley, through his call for the facilitation, 
rather than the limitation, of campaign-related speech, advances a 
powerful insight. And by combining the ballot with digital 
technology, he very well may have identified the rarest of creatures: a 
potentially effective and constitutionally permissible counterweight to 
other forms of campaign-related speech. The reform-minded 
nevertheless should tread carefully. “That the current information 
landscape has its distortions . . . is no reason to entertain the idea of 
adulterations from new quarters.”19 
 
 
 18  For a discussion of a study that exposed participants to images of well-known 
politicians subtly blended with photographs of the participants themselves, see id.  
 19  Zittrain, supra note 15, at 340–41 (footnote omitted). 
